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A considerable amount of academic interest has been devoted to the dispute settlement 
(DS) mechanisms of the GATT and the WTO, in particularly during the last decade. The 
purpose of this paper is to present and discuss what we see as main themes in this body of 
research, and in particular the empirical work on the functioning of the DS system. 
 
The large volume of research in the field makes it is necessary to restrict attention to a 
few areas. We will concentrate on a couple of themes that we find particularly interesting, 
omitting many other (and surely to others more interesting) issues. A noticeable omission 
is that we will not deal with enforcement issues, this literature being too extensive to be 
covered in this survey.  
 
The paper is structured as follows. Sections II and III provides, respectively, legal and 
economic backgrounds to the ensuing discussion. Section II highlights quintessential 
elements of the DS mechanism in the WTO – the Understanding on Rules and 
Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes (DSU). Section III then briefly 
discusses the role of dispute settlement from the angle of economic theory. The more 
policy-oriented literature often views the objective of dispute settlement as to resolve 
conflicts, to enhance transparency and predictability, or to implement the agreed 
liberalization of trade. But such explanations are not satisfactory from the point of view 
of economic theory, which seeks to explain how the DS mechanism may help achieve the 
various aims that have been suggested, and how these aims may interact with on another. 
For example, the desire to ease the resolution of disputes may conflict with the desire to 
maintain system integrity, and while transparency may increase the predictability of the 
system, it can make settlement, and trade liberalization, more difficult. Economic theory 
does certainly not offer satisfactory explanations for all these matters, but provides at 
least a few insights into the functioning of dispute settlement. 
   2
Section IV discusses two main themes in the empirical literature on dispute settlement, 
the first being the determinants of the participation in dispute settlement processes, and 
the second the role of the DS system for the settling of disputes. In this section we also 
point to a number of aspects of this body of research that we believe are in need of 
improvement. Some of these are quite clearly “researchable”, while it is less clear in 
other cases how to they could be tackled. 
 
Section V, finally, points to some additional areas that we believe are important for 
understanding how the DSU operates, and which believe deserve more attention. 
 
Before turning to the literature review, we would like to mention that we have assembled 
an extensive data set that is available for free downloading from the website of the World 
Bank (found under www.worldbank.org/trade). The data set currently covers all 311 
WTO disputes initiated through the official filing of a Request for Consultations at the 
WTO, from 1 January 1995 until July 31, 2004, and for these disputes it includes events 
occurring until February 28, 2005. The data set covers exhaustively all stages of dispute 
settlement proceedings, from the moment when consultations are being requested to the 
eventual implementation of the rulings. It contains several hundred variables, providing 
information on various aspects of the legal procedure. The intention is to update this data 
set early in 2007 to include all disputes and events up to the end of 2006. The data set is 
described in Horn and Mavroidis [2006a]. 
 
 
II.  THE WTO MECHANISM FOR DISPUTE RESOLUTION: THE DSU 
 
We will in this section provide a very brief introduction to salient features of the DSU. A 
more detailed description can be found in Palmeter and Mavroidis [2004]. 
 
The DSU is one of many annexes to the agreement establishing the WTO. The 
administration of disputes is entrusted to the Dispute Settlement Body (DSB), comprised 
of representatives of all WTO Members. The system is highly decentralized: disputes   3
cannot be initiated ex officio; there is no authority assigned to a supra-national entity (a 
watchdog) to initiate complaints against WTO Members; and disputes are launched at the 
initiative of a WTO Member. 
 
Adjudication in the WTO system has two phases: one in principle bilateral, and one 
multilateral. The bilateral phase consists of consultations between the complainant and 
the defendant. 
 
Few disputes are of a purely bilateral nature however, and even if this is the case, other 
WTO Members might have an interest in the interpretation of the rules pertinent to this 
particular transaction since, arguably, such interpretation might be influential in 
interpreting their own commitments in the future. To this effect, when requesting 
consultations, the complainant has to notify the WTO as to the subject-matter of the 
dispute. Other WTO Members wishing to join as co-complainants can do so, provided 
that the defendant accepts their request (Art. 4.11 DSU). 
 
The subject-matter of a particular dispute can range from disagreement over a particular 
transaction and its consistency with the relevant WTO law (e.g., A believes that B 
imposed antidumping duties without having demonstrated any injury resulting from 
dumped imports), to disagreements over the consistency of a legislation with the WTO 
rules (e.g., A believes that B, by enacting legislation which precludes its investigating 
authorities from conducting injury-analysis in the context of an antidumping 
investigation, is violating its obligations under the WTO). The standard of review 
however, is more demanding in the latter case. 
 
Assuming that the parties reach no solution during the consultations-stage, the 
complainant can request the establishment of a panel to adjudicate the dispute. Such a 
request leads to the second, multilateral phase, consisting of two parts: the first is the 
panel procedures, the panel being the analog to a first instance court; the second part is 
the procedure before the Appellate Body, the last instance court. Whereas the three-
person panels are ad hoc adjudicating bodies, the composition of which depends, in   4
principle, on the will of the parties to the dispute (and, in case of disagreement between 
them, panelists will be appointed by the Director General of the WTO), the Appellate 
Body is composed of seven judges appointed on four years terms, renewable once. Panels 
have competence to review the factual record and the legal issues before them, whereas 
the Appellate Body’s review is limited to the latter.
1 
 
Following a request for establishment of a panel, other WTO Members have a limited 
time within which they can request to appear before the panel as third parties and present 
their views on a particular case. Panels are assisted by members of the WTO secretariat 
(usually lawyers, and occasionally economists as well). The role of the secretariat should 
not be under-estimated: it is normally the secretariat that drafts the reports, even though 
panelists of course have the last word. Importantly, with the exception of secretariat 
members working for the Appellate Body, members of the secretariat, besides advising 
the members of the panel they are assigned to, also advise WTO Members on issues of 
their competence, and are thus not assigned exclusively to service panels. 
 
Assuming that the Appellate Body accepts the original complaint,
2 the defendant will be 
requested to implement the judgment. Implementation should, if possible, occur 
immediately, although this is hardly ever the case. Instead, defendants are are granted an 
implementation period, that is either agreed bilaterally, or through recourse to binding 
arbitration. 
 
Defendants do not always have sufficient guidance to implement a judgment against 
them. The lack of guidance is a direct consequence of adjudicating body reports that 
merely recommends the losing respondent to bring its measures into compliance with its 
obligations. In the unusual instance where adjudicating body reports suggest ways to 
implement the final judgment, the addressees of suggestions are nevertheless free to 
choose their way of complying, since suggestions are not legally binding. As a result, 
disagreements as to whether implementation has truly occurred easily arise. In such case, 
                                                 
1 However, the distinction between a factual and a legal issue is often over-stated in legal literature, since 
many disagreements about facts can be formulated in terms of a legal issue. 
2 If the Appellate Body rejects the original complaint, the case will, of course, be closed.   5
the dispute is referred to a compliance panel whose task it is to determine whether 
implementation occurred; the panel’s report can be appealed.  
 
If the complainant believes that no implementation has occurred, the complainant can 
request authorization to suspend concessions. If granted, the complainant will have the 
right to raise its bound duties to the level necessary to inflict on the defendant damage 
equal in value to the damage the complainant suffered as a result of the practice that was 
found to be illegal.  
 
The entire adjudication process can, in practice, take up to three years. Nothing prohibits 
however WTO Members to reach a Mutually Agreed Solution (MAS) at any stage 
throughout the process. A MAS must be notified to the DSB, where any WTO Member 
can raise questions as to its consistency with the WTO rules. 
 
Having presented some salient features of the DSU, we will now turn to studies that may 
help shed light on how the DSU works. In the following section, we will briefly set out 
some ideas concerning the possible economic role of such a system in a trade agreement. 
In section IV we then turn to empirical work that seeks to shed light on the actual 
working of the system. 
 
 
III.  THE ROLE OF THE WTO DISPUTE SETTLEMENT MECHANISM 
 
An important (implicit or explicit) aim of the empirical literature discussed below, is to 
evaluate whether the DS mechanism in the GATT and the WTO have fulfilled their 
purposes. The task obviously requires an understanding of what these purposes are and 
how they are meant to be achieved, and it is natural to start from objectives expressed by 
legislators in the agreement, or elsewhere. But, such stated objectives are often expressed 
in very imprecise language. To appreciate the role of the DS mechanism, it is therefore 
necessary to view it from a more theoretical point of view.
3 
                                                 
3 We will here be extremely brief. For a fuller survey of the economic theory literature on trade agreements,   6
 
The question of what role a formal DS system might serve may at first glance seem 
superfluous, the answer being seemingly obvious: to help adjudicate, and possibly also 
avoid, disputes. At closer scrutiny, however, matters are not as simple, in particular not 
once account is taken of the possibility for members to let informal mechanisms solve the 
same problem. But one can identify several possible rationales for a formal settlement 
system. In present these, we need first to highlight two central, and in the literature often 
emphasized, constraints on the scope of any international trade agreement of such a broad 
nature as the WTO.  
 
III.1  Two inevitable features of trade agreements 
There is a fundamental difference between the circumstances under which a trade 
agreement operates, and those under which parties contract under domestic law. In the 
latter case, contracts can be enforced by third parties, such as courts, who have at their 
disposal the ability to issue physical action, such as a intervention. This allows the 
contracting parties to include provisions that for certain contingencies specify courses of 
actions that would not be voluntarily undertaken by all parties to the contract  
 
In the case of a trade agreement there is no outside party who can ensure that the 
members to the agreement abide by their obligations, and as a result, it must be self-
enforcing.
4 The crucial implication of this is that the agreement, and its dispute resolution 
mechanism, must be such that it is always in the interest of each member to behave so as 
to preserve the integrity of the agreement. In other words, members must not be put in 
positions where they would prefer to sacrifice the collaboration for short-run gains. The 
essential mechanism that allows the parties to make a meaningful agreement is thus the 
threat of withdrawal from the agreement by an adversely affected party. Countries are 
largely stuck with each other, and typically expect to remain so for the foreseeable future, 
and contract breach by a country is likely to be observed not only by directly affected 
partners, but also by the membership as a whole.  
                                                                                                                                                   
and on dispute settlement, see Staiger [1995}. 
4 We are not aware of any legal/economic analysis of the extent to which members to a trade agreement 
may contract third countries to help in the enforcement of the agreement.    7
 
The second constraint on an agreement with a scope such as the GATT/ WTO, stems 
from the fact that such an agreement must for practical reasons be incomplete: it will 
contain relatively few explicit, detailed specifications obligations (such as tariff bindings 
specified at a rather disaggregate product level), but much or most of its ambit will be 
contained in vaguely specified provisions, such as that of National Treatment. As a result, 
the determination of the exact ambit is left to be decided in the future, when a conflict 
arises.  
 
If the agreement contains a dispute resolution mechanism, it is likely to carry a heavy 
burden in two respects. First, it is likely to have to administer a large number of disputes 
due to the fact that so much in the contract is left unspecified. And, second, a significant 
responsibility rests on this mechanism, since it is likely to play a very prominent role in 
shaping the practical ambit of the agreement. 
  
III.2  The pros and cons of an explicit dispute settlement mechanism 
What has been seen so far is thus that agreements must, out of necessity, be incomplete as 
well as self-enforcing. Clearly, this will limit the impact of the agreement but the threat of 
future punishment for violations by the respective parties (signatories?) may deter 
'asocial' behavior. It is necessary to explain however, why such an understanding may 
benefit from the inclusion of an explicit dispute settlement mechanism, such as the DSU. 
We must also ask why the parties cannot rely only on an implicit understanding of the 
agreement.  
 
One might assume that the fairly extensive economic literature on trade agreements 
should provide explanations for the rationale for such agreements. However, the bulk of 
this literature focuses on the determinants of the tariff levels that a cooperative outcome 
would yield, rather than on the legal form that such an outcome would be packaged in. 
Indeed, the formal structure of many of the repeated game models employed in this 
literature, is basically identical to the structure of those employed to analyze collusion in 
product markets. As often emphasized in the latter literature, there need not be any   8
difference from an economic point of view between a collusive outcome resulting from 
implicitly coordinated price setting, and an outright cartel. That is, in these models there 
is typically no particular economic role played by the fact that the agreement between the 
firms is explicit, rather than implicit. For the same reason, economic models of trade 
agreements do typically not distinguish between tariff reductions resulting from an 
implicit understanding between trading partners, and resulting from an explicit 
agreement. From an economic point of view, the question remains as to why one form is 
chosen over the other.  
 
The two central aspects of trade agreements mentioned above provide them with different 
possible roles. A first role stems from the fact that in order for the agreement to be self-
enforcing, there must be a common understanding of what constitutes a cooperative 
behavior, and what amounts to a violation of the implicit agreement. However, for very 
much the same reasons that gave rise to the incompleteness of the contract, it is extremely 
difficult for the trading partners to implicitly form a common understanding. An 
explicitly agreed format for the interpretation of the agreement, and for the resolution of 
disputes, may therefore help achieve coordination in at least two ways. First, the case law 
it produces may gradually fill the “gaps” in the agreement, thus slowly making the 
agreement less incomplete. However, in practice, adjudicating bodies seem skeptical 
about playing an active role in this regard, viewing it as impermissible judicial activity, 
whereby the judge takes the role of the legislator. Also, there seems to be a fear that when 
creating case law, future decisions may be constrained in unforeseeable ways. The second 
way in which an explicit agreement can ease the coordination problem, is by specifying 
an agreed-upon procedure for adjudication. The legislators thus avoid the difficulty of 
working out the details of the contract by agreeing to let a third party - a judge, for 
example - adjudicate on their behalf; the legislators accept the outcome of the ruling as 
the outcome of the unfinished negotiation.
5 
6  
                                                 
5 The “tie-breaking” task could actually be performed by any method that is agreed upon in advance. For 
instance, an agreement to flip a coin would serve this purpose. But there would then be no relationship 
between the characteristics of the case at hand, and its outcome. It is thus not likely to have particularly 
beneficial within-dispute impact, even if it would help keep the agreement together.  
6 Another coordination role a DS system could serve would arise if members that are not participants in a 
dispute could participate in the withdrawal of concessions. The advantages of such systems are examined   9
 
The second reason why there is scope for an explicit DS mechanism also stems from the 
complexity of the issues at stake: There will be a very large number of measures that fall 
in a grey zone between what is clearly allowed and what is clearly illegal. The decision of 
where to draw the boundary cannot be done with any degree of scientific precision and it 
would therefore be tempting for the parties to interpret the scope of the agreement with an 
eye to only their own interests. The potential for this kind of moral hazard problem 
suggests that adjudication should be compulsory, and that the adjudication process should 
be performed by a disinterested party, so that the adjudication gains a reputation for 
transparency and impartiality. An explicit agreement greatly eases this task for third 
parties. 
 
A third reason for an explicit agreement stems from the fact that members can be 
expected be both complainants and respondents. For instance, a simple way of avoiding 
gaps in the coverage of the contract would be to let e.g. the complainant unilaterally 
decide the course of action whenever the agreement left this open. However, members 
know ex ante the signing of the agreement that due to the unclear undertakings in the 
contract, they will over time sometimes find themselves in the complainant’s position, 
and sometimes in that of the respondent. As noted by Ethier [2001a], it is therefore likely 
that each member has an interest in ensuring that while there are punishments for 
violations of the agreement, that these are not too strong.
7 The DSU has indeed chosen an 
intermediate form of punishment, with remedies that should be (at most) commensurate 
with committed illegalities. Given the incentives for complainants to meter out very 
strong countermeasures, there are advantages in letting a third party determine what is 
                                                                                                                                                   
by Maggi [1999], and by Bagwell et al [2004]. See Lawrence [2003] for a comprehensive discussion of the 
role of retaliation (countermeasures) in the WTO. 
7 It could possibly be argued that it is not necessary for countries to potentially find themselves in the roles 
of both complainants and respondents, in order for them to agree on limited punishments. Even if their 
roles as complainants and respondents would be predetermined, they might in an ex ante negotiation over 
the rules of the DS mechanism agree on limited punishments, realizing that draconian punishments, as 
desired by complainants, as well as very limited punishments, as desired by respondents, may deter 
countries from liberalizing trade. Whether or not this is the case is likely to depend on the exact bargaining 
format.    10
commensurate in any particular situation – this may be a role for a formal dispute 
settlement mechanism to play. 
 
Finally, a formal DS system may ease the problem of enforcement problem by helping to 
instill in members of the agreement a sense of “international obligation”. This notion has 
considerable support particularly in the international relations literature, but has been 
much less commonly examined in the economics literature (a noticeable exception being 
the work of Kovenock and Thursby [1992]). Similarly, a third-party evaluation of alleged 
breaches of the agreement is likely to have a stronger name-and-shame effect, than if the 
parties themselves were to determine inconsistencies and adjudicate conflicts, as 
emphasized by e.g. Schwartz and Sykes [2002]. 
 
The above-mentioned benefits of a DS mechanism must of course be set against its costs. 
There are the obvious costs in terms of administration, even though it is far from clear 
that a centralized mechanism is more costly then a decentralized system; if anything, the 
opposite seems more likely. But there are also less obvious drawbacks associated with an 
explicit dispute resolution mechanism in a self-enforcing agreement, due to the fact that it 
may weaken the forces maintaining system integrity. 
 
The weakening of the incentives to retaliate may come about for at least two reasons. One 
is illustrated by Hungerford [1991], who adapts a “Green and Porter model” to a trade 
agreement context.
8 In Hungerford’s model, countries have access to tariffs as well as 
non-tariff barriers (NTBs). Tariffs are assumed to be readily observable by members, as 
are their terms-of-trade. However, members cannot directly observe other members’ 
NTBs, nor can they directly observe other exogenous random events that may affect their 
terms-of trade, such as changes in world market prices, consumer incomes, etc. Hence, an 
exporting country hence cannot tell whether bad terms-of-trade are due to unfortunate 
random events, or to NTBs imposed by partners. Countries cannot form an explicit 
agreement to reduce these barriers, since NTBs cannot be directly monitored.  But 
Hungerford [1991] shows that absent a DS system, there is nevertheless an equilibrium 
                                                 
8 Similar frameworks have also been employed by Riezman [1991] and Furusawa [2003}.   11
where members abstain from invoking NTBs, due to the repeated nature of the 
interaction. This equilibrium has the undesirable feature however, that when a member 
suffers a sufficiently severe terms-of-trade shock, the source of which could hence either 
be unobservable NTBs or unobservable demand shocks, it will have to punish the partner 
by withdrawing a concession, and increasing thus its observable tariff temporarily, 
regardless of its origin.  The reason is that if members did not systematically do so, there 
would be incentives for partners to cheat on the agreement. In this equilibrium one would 
thus over time witness periods where countries trade “peacefully”, interspersed with 
temporary “trade wars” resulting from adverse external events for importing countries.  
 
What effect would a DS system then have? An essential feature of a DS system is that it 
typically requires members (as well as adjudicating bodies) to investigate the reasons for 
the shift in terms-of-trade, before withdrawing concessions.  If these investigations fully 
reveal these reasons, all unnecessary punishments could be avoided. Hence, by ensuring 
that information is gathered, the DS system reduces the need for misplaced retaliatory 
action designed to maintain the integrity of the agreement. This would be a desirable 
consequence of a well-functioning DS system, closely related to the one mentioned 
above, related to the benefit of a transparent third-party adjudicator. 
 
But a DS system is not only an information gathering device, it typically also imposes 
restrictions on members’ rights to take unilateral action when they perceive to have been 
cheated. This maybe necessary to induce countries to enter an agreement, as noted above. 
, as noted above. However, it also implies that the force for maintaining the integrity of 
the agreement is weakened or removed. To see why this may have severe consequences, 
consider in the context of the Hungerford [1991] model, the extreme situation where the 
investigation required by the DS system is completely un-informative. In this case the 
existence of a (compulsory) DS system will only serve to weaken the trade agreement, 
and would thus reduce the joint welfare of the parties.   
 
The conclusion is hence that it is crucial that if a DS system imposes restrictions on 
members’ ability to retaliate, that it also offers a reliable mechanism for information   12
extraction. More generally, as also pointed out by e.g. Staiger [1995], there is an inherent 
conflict between the desire to maintain rule integrity and the desire to facilitate the 
resolution of disputes. 
 
A second special feature of the DSU is that it encourages a negotiated settlement: 
 
A solution mutually acceptable to the parties to a dispute and consistent with the covered 
agreements is clearly to be preferred. (3.7 DSU) 
 
Laudable as it may seem to seek to cushion conflicts between the parties, it provides 
another reason why an explicit DS system may threaten system integrity. This aspect is 
demonstrated by Ludema [2001], who reasons (very roughly) as follows: The DS system 
opens a door for bilateral negotiations, should a conflict arise. Once members find 
themselves in such a situation, they tend to have incentives to resolve the dispute without 
unnecessary delay, forgetting past grievances.
9 But this softening of the repercussions of 
violations of the agreement is foreseen at an earlier stage. That is, by forcing members to 
try to resolve conflicts in a “civilized manner”, the threat of such conflicts loses some of 
their deterrence, and thus reduces the incentives for members to avoid conflicts.
10 
 
Yet another drawback of an explicit DS mechanism is highlighted in Guzman [2002], 
who attempts to explain why not all international agreements have mandatory dispute 
resolution mechanisms. The core notion in Guzman’s [2002] theory is the assumption 
that naming-and-shaming causes net joint costs to the members of the agreement: the 
reputational loss to the losing respondent is not compensated for through an equal gain to 
for the other party. Against the gains from improved system integrity in situations where 
members abide by the agreement where they absent the naming-and-shaming otherwise 
would not, must thus set the costs caused in cases where there anyway is no compliance. 
 
                                                 
9 One can here note the fact that the majority of disputes that are notified to the WTO never reach the panel 
stage. 
10 Without drifting into the issue of remedies, let us just note that several authors, such as Schwartz and 
Sykes [2002], and Ethier [2001b], suggest that the purpose of the DSU is indeed to limit the bite of 
remedies.   13
 
IV.  THE TWO MAIN THEMES IN THE EMPIRICAL LITERATURE 
 
We now turn to empirical research on dispute settlement in the GATT/WTO. There is a 
very large body of writings on this general topic, far too large to be surveyed in a single 
paper. We will in this section discuss papers focusing on what we see as the two main 
themes in this area: the determinants of participation in disputes, and the impact of DS 
settlement in the GATT/WTO on the process (and particularly likelihood) of settlement. 
Due to space limitations, we cannot provide detailed descriptions of studies on these 
topics, but only say a few words about the main issues addressed, the methods employed, 
and the results obtained.  
 
Due to the complexity of the object of study, and the resulting inadequacy of theory, it is 
inevitable that any study on these issues can be criticized on a number of grounds. We 
therefore tend to see the results to be reported more as suggestive of empirical 
relationships, than as “proofs” of the existence (or non-existence) of these relationships. 
For this reason we refrain from criticizing individual papers, and instead at the end of the 




IV.1  What determines participation in disputes? 
A frequent allegation in the policy debate over the working of the DSU is that 
participation in the DS mechanism is biased to the disadvantage of poorer/smaller 
countries. These claims take various forms: for instance, it is argued that developing 
countries do not launch complaints as frequently as they should, or that they are targeted 
more frequently by richer countries than they should be. There is an empirical literature 
that seeks to examine the correctness of these claims, and that attempts to highlight the 
determinants of participation in the DS system more generally.  
 
 
                                                 
11 There are many similarities between this paper and the survey by Busch and Reinhardt [2002].   14
IV.1.1 A basic issue: what is the unit of account? 
Intuitive as these claims may seem, the literature confronts several severe conceptual 
problems. We will return to some of these below, but let us first briefly examine the issue 
of choosing the unit of account. In order for a claim such as “developing countries do not 
complain as often as they should” to be meaningful, there must be a way of counting 
participation, and the manner in which this is done may have an important effect on the 
outcome of the investigation. A simple solution is of course to say that whenever there is 
a consultation request registered by the WTO Secretariat (as indicated by a new Dispute 
Settlement number being assigned by the Secretariat), there is a dispute. This is indeed 
the path that has been followed in much of the descriptive, quantitative legal literature. 
Such an approach would be based on a number of (typically implicit) assumptions. For 
instance, the Bananas dispute DS27, which involved five countries as complainants, and 
in which four additional countries requested to join consultations, would count as just one 
dispute. An alternative might be to consider this case as involving five (or nine) bilateral 
disputes. 
 
There are also other complications. For instance, what essentially seems as the same 
dispute as DS27 was filed earlier by four of the five countries, as DS16. Should this count 
as independent dispute(s)? Furthermore, a request for consultation may involve a very 
specific aspect of a very specific measure, or it may address a number of aspects of a 
number of different measures. However, in both cases the investigation would count is as 
only one dispute. It is easy to identify questions for which these features of the unit of 
account would be clearly undesirable, but it is typically much more difficult to determine 
a satisfactory definition of “a” dispute. There is no generally correct way of defining a 
dispute. Rather, what is appropriate depends on the exact question at stake. It should also 
be noted that the problem of choosing unit of account is not restricted to studies of 
participation, but is affects any study that seeks to draw inferences across disputes. 
 
IV.1.2 Trade interests as a determinant of participation 
As already mentioned, the determinants of participation in the WTO DS system has been 
examined in a number of papers. Horn et al. [1999] focus on the question of whether   15
participation as complainant in the WTO DS system is biased to the disadvantage of 
smaller and poorer members, in the sense that they complain less often than they 
“should”. Clearly, in order to address this issue, there is a need for a definition of an 
unbiased benchmark. For instance, it is highly likely that a country that exports many 
products to many markets will encounter more illegalities than a country that mainly 
exports one product to one market. Consequently, the former should have more issues to 
complain about, but how much more? Furthermore, larger traders are more likely to trade 
products in such large volumes as to make it profitable to carry the partly fixed costs of 
litigation, and should therefore be expected to be more often featuring as complainants. 
Should this be taken into account in the definition of the unbiased benchmark? As can be 
seen, the definition of the unbiased benchmark is far from trivial. 
 
Horn  et al [1999] start from the premise that the unbiased benchmark should allow 
members to complain proportionally to the number of questionable trade measures they 
encounter. Lacking a convincing theoretical prediction for the number of illegalities 
committed per country, and hence faced by trading partners, they assume that countries 
commit illegalities for each imported product with the same frequency, regardless of the 
nature of the exporting country or of the product. Using data for the first four years of the 
WTO DS system, and with products defined at the 4-digit HS level, Horn et al [1999] 
show that the actual distribution of bilateral disputes across members are fairly well 
predicted by their suggested non-biased benchmark, in particular when the latter is 
adjusted in order to exclude exports with smaller values (assuming that such values are 
not worthwhile to litigate about).  
 
Bown [2005] substantially refines this analysis. As noted, countries can choose to pursue 
disputes by themselves, they can participate as co-complainants or as third parties. Or 
they can decide to not participate at all, free-riding on the efforts of other countries, or 
perhaps, on the contrary, being hurt by the litigation. Bown [2005] considers the 
determinants of these choices on the basis of the 116 disputes during 1995-2001 in which 
importing countries were found to illegally restrict imports. Disputes are divided into two 
separate sets, depending on whether they concern discriminatory measures, or non-  16
discriminatory measures. For each of the disputes involving discriminatory measures, 
exporters to the market (defined at the 6-digit HS level) are divided into two groups: 
those that are harmed by the measure, and those that benefit (by being exempted, for 
example). For approximately half of the group of disputes involving discriminatory 
measures, Bown [2005] further identifies other countries that were also harmed by the 
measure, but who did not participate in the legal process. This data is then employed in a 
multinomial logit model in order to examine the impact on the propensity to complain, to 
be a third party or to free ride, of various factors that may plausibly affect participation.  
 
With regard to disputes over measures that adversely affect many trading partners, it is 
shown that size of exports is positively related to the propensity to complain, in line with 
the finding of Horn et al [1999]. It is also positively related to participation as a third 
party, and negatively related to the propensity to free ride. 
 
IV.1.3 “Legal capacity” and “power” as determinants of participation 
Some notion of trade interest can go quite far in explaining the distribution of disputes 
across countries, but it is clear that it cannot provide the whole picture. Two intuitively 
appealing hypothesis have therefore been examined in the literature. According to the 
“Legal Capacity Hypothesis”, the lack of legal capacity of prevents poorer countries from 
participating as complainants as much as they “should”. The second hypothesis, dubbed 
the “Power Hypothesis”, holds that smaller/poorer countries complain less against 
larger/richer countries that they “should” due to their lack of “power”. Various reasons 
have been suggested, such that they do not expect to be able to enforce rulings, or that 
they fear a back-lash in other forms, such as loss of preferential treatment in trade, or 
some form of non-trade retaliation such as reduced foreign aid, or military assistance.  
 
Several studies have highlighted the role of these suggested explanations for participation 
in the DSU, in particular. The two explanations have often been juxtaposed, even though 
they are by no means mutually exclusive. Horn et al [1999] make a simplistic 
examination of the two popular claims. Using the size of countries’ WTO delegations in 
Geneva as a proxy for countries’ legal capacity, Horn et al [1999] find some, but weak,   17
support for the notion that countries with more legal capacity litigate more, controlling 
for trade interests. To shed some light on the Power Hypothesis, Horn et al [1999] 
aggregate WTO members into four groups – G4, other OECD countries, developing 
countries other than LDCs, and LDCs – and consider whether the pattern of litigation 
between these groups suggested any bias, using the above-described definition of a non-
biased benchmark. Contrary to what the Power Hypothesis would seem to suggest, they 
find that developing countries other than LDCs are over-represented as complainants 
against both G4 countries and against other OECD countries, and that they are under-
represented as respondents against G4 countries, while the pattern as respondents against 
other OECD countries is more mixed. It is difficult to draw any strong conclusions 
concerning LDCs. The crude measure employed suggests that they are underrepresented 
both as complainants and respondents against developed countries, but the numbers 
involved are so small that that this finding is hard to interpret. 
 
Bown [2005] also examines the role of the Legal and Power Hypotheses. Bown [2005] 
finds some, albeit weak, support for the Legal Capacity Hypotheses, in that the 
coefficients for the variables GDP per capita and the size of WTO delegations have the 
expected signs, even though not being highly significant. But Bown [2005] also finds 
strong evidence for some form of Power Hypothesis, showing that the nature of the 
bilateral relationship between the importing country and exporters plays an import role in 
determining whether to complain, act as a third party, or abstain, in disputes involving 
illegalities that have an adverse effect on a number of countries. It is thus shown that a 
high share of the respondent’s exports going to a certain country makes it more likely that 
this country will be a complainant (and less likely that it will free ride). A possible 
interpretation here is that “power” matters in the decision to complain, since such a high 
share makes the enforcement possibilities stronger. However, this relationship holds also 
when considering only a subset of fairly large exporters, where there would intuitively 
seem to be less role for “power” to be at play. The interpretation thus seems to be either 
that this intuition is flawed, and that “power” is important also in the relationship between 
more developed countries, or that the relationship captures something else than what 
associate with “power”.    18
 
Guzman and Simmons [2005] shed further light on the Legal Capacity- and Power 
Hypotheses- explanations of the determinants of participation. Guzman and Simmons 
[2005] interpret the Power Hypothesis to refer to the amount of power a member can 
exert outside the system (such as the withdrawal of aid), and do not include in this 
concept power exerted within the multilateral system (such as the amount of concessions 
that a complainant can credibly threaten to withdraw). Their data set is based on bilateral 
disputes in the WTO between 1995 and April 2004, as defined by requests for 
consultations. The study regresses the GDP of the defendant against a number of 
explanatory variables, and controls. The GDP of the defendant is interpreted as a measure 
of both its market size and its political power. A main explanatory variable is the GDP of 
the complainant. GDP is a natural measure of the (absolute) power of the complainant, 
and to the extent that this is an important factor driving the decision of whether to 
complain, one would expect there to be a positive relation to the GDP of the respondent: 
only economically large countries would challenge other large countries. But it should 
also measure a country’s capacity to pursue disputes: a large country is likely to have 
more resources to use for disputes. If it plays an important role in this respect, one would 
expect to see a negative relationship between this variable and the GDP of the defendant: 
a capacity constrained exporter will concentrate on the disputes that involve the largest 
stakes, and they typically concern the large markets. Countries with more resources – a 
higher GDP – can also go after the smaller fry, and will thus be more likely to litigate 
against small countries. 
 
Guzman and Simmons [2005] also include other proxies for legal capacity. In addition to 
the commonly employed variable capturing the size of countries’ Geneva delegations, 
they include the number of embassies abroad, countries’ non-military government 
expenditures, and an index for the quality of government bureaucracies drawn from 
International Country Risk Guide. They also use a number of controls. 
 
Several OLS model specifications are run. One specification includes the size of 
complainants’ GDP, which is found to be negatively and significantly correlated with the   19
GDP of respondents, thus supporting the Legal Capacity Hypothesis and refuting the 
Power Hypothesis. The remaining specifications exclude complainant GDP, but include 
GDP per capita, which is negatively related to the GDP of the respondent (although not 
always significantly so). They also include one of the other above-mentioned measures of 
legal capacity. In each case, the included variable comes out highly significant and with 
the expected sign, except for the measure of the quality of the government bureaucracy. 
 
Positively and significantly related to the GDP of respondents is also the value of the 
imports by the complainant from the respondent. One interpretation of this finding would 
be that it supports the Power Hypothesis. However, Guzman and Simmons [2005] prefer 
to see this variable as a control, and interpret the finding to merely indicate that large 
respondents tend to export a lot. There are also a number of other controls that are 
significantly correlated with respondent GDP. 
 
Overall, Guzman and Simmons [2005] see their results as supporting the primacy of the 
Legal Capacity Hypothesis over the Power Hypothesis as an explanation of the choice of 
respondents. More generally, they conclude that even though it is very difficult to 
determine a non-biased benchmark for developing country participation, these countries 
seem constrained by limited legal resources to sue the system as frequently as richer 
countries. Because of such constraints, developing countries are more selective as to 
which cases they challenge before the WTO. However, lack of “power” does not seem to 
be an important explanatory factor. 
 
IV.1.4 Membership of a preferential trading arrangement as a determinant of 
(non)-participation 
Several authors find that countries tend to complain less against other members of the 
same preferential trade agreement to which they themselves belong. For instance, Bown 
[2005] finds that a highly significant, and also quantitatively important factor is whether 
the potential complainant belongs to the same preferential trading arrangement as the 
country with the illegal import measure: exporters are much less likely to complain 
against countries belonging to the same preferential trade agreement, or act as third   20
parties in such disputes. Furthermore, it is shown that the importance of the importing 
country as a donor of foreign aid to potential complainants tend to vary positively with 
the propensity of the latter to abstain from participating in disputes, and negatively with 
the propensity to act as third party. 
  
IV.1.5. The form of political governance as a determinant of participation 
A different perspective on participation in the DS system is provided by Reinhardt 
[2000], who considers the role of the form of political governance for participation. The 
decision by a country to launch a dispute is the result of a domestic political process, and 
one should expect the nature of such a process to be highly dependent on the political 
institutions in the country, in particular since private parties do not have standing before 
the WTO, and the selection of conflicts to be brought to the WTO thus is made by 
government institutions or politicians. Reinhardt [2000] examines a number of aspects of 
this issue, one being whether democracies are more or less likely to complain before the 
WTO. A number of theoretical arguments can be made in either direction, so while it 
seems plausible that the political system may affect the propensity complain, the direction 
is unclear.  
 
Reinhardt [2000] uses a rich data set comprising all 604 “bilateral” disputes that occurred 
during the period 1948-1998. The statistical models employ, in addition to indices for 
democracy, a number of explanatory variables capturing aspects of GATT/WTO 
members, and use various probit specifications.  
 
A main finding is that the more democratic a state is, the more it will initiate disputes, 
controlling for the trading countries’ relative size, and for one country’s dependence on 
trade with the other. Furthermore, this effect is very strong, quantitatively speaking. 
Reinhardt [2000] also shows that not only are democracies more likely to initiate 
disputes, there is also a strong tendency for democracies to be targeted more often. The 
offered explanation is that democratic governments will be more susceptible to domestic 
pressure for protection, and will as a result be more prone to implement illegal measures, 
or not to implement agreed-upon liberalization, and thus be the targets of litigation.   21
Furthermore, a country is more likely to initiate disputes against other countries that 
account for a large share of the first country’s imports and exports, and also against 
countries that depend on it for their imports and exports, partly in line with the finding of 
Bown [2005]. 
 
Reinhardt [2000] also considers the impact of the creation of the DSU, revealing that it 
had no significant impact for probability of dispute initiation between developed 
countries. The creation of the DSU did however significantly lower the probability of 
disputes being filed by developing countries, and it significantly increased the probability 
of a developing country being targeted. Reinhardt [2000] concludes that the rise in the 
number of disputes in the multilateral trading system is not the result of the introduction 
of the DSU, but stems from the underlying increased dependence on foreign trade, in line 
with the trade interest explanation of participation, and on the general democratization of 
the world. 
 
IV.1.6 Retaliation as a determinant of participation 
Casual observation suggests that countries occasionally complain in retaliation for 
previously being the target of complaints. This is a special case of the situation where 
complaints are not only based on the merits of the case, but also on the characteristics of 
the potential adversary. The literature contains a few tests of the prevalence of this type 
of behavior. For example, Reinhardt [2000] includes for this purpose a binary variables 
capturing whether in the previous year the respondent initiated a dispute against the 
complainant side. This variables is highly significant, indicating that a dispute in the 
previous year increases the probability of a dispute in the opposite direction the year 
thereafter with a factor of 55. 
 
Bown discusses the role of retaliation in several of his papers. In Bown [2002] he 
explores the possibility of violation of the agreement by a country facing and not facing 
retaliation (or threat thereof). Bown [2004a] finds substantial evidence showing that 
threat of retaliation by the victorious complainant yields credibility so as to allow 
defendants to honor their commitments. In a related paper, Bown [2004b] finds that   22
developing countries have recognized the importance of retaliatory threats, and have 
responded by changing their pattern of initiation of disputes, so as to take better 
advantage of the instances where they have leverage to threaten retaliation and thus 
induce compliance. 
 
At a more disaggregated level, Blonigen and Bown [2003] find that the threat of a 
retaliatory antidumping investigation makes it less likely that a WTO Member will name 
the country that will likely retaliate among the countries that will be investigated for 
alleged dumping practices. They also find that the prospect that a particular WTO 
member might launch a complaint (in any field of the WTO), makes it less likely that a 
member investigating dumping practices might end up with a positive finding of injurious 
dumping against companies originating in the country threatening with a complaint. 
 
IV.2  What determines the duration of disputes? 
The majority of the requests for consultation that are filed with the WTO are not 
determined by WTO adjudicating bodies, but by the parties alone. The majority of 
disputes thus lead to either an officially announced (as requested per the DSU) Mutually 
Agreed Solution, or simply remain inactive indefinitely, and is thus presumably solved. 
As mentioned above, the DSU sees a MAS as the preferred mode of resolving disputes, 
so a settlement is from this point of view desirable; this view is understandable in that a 
decision to move the dispute to a panel stage constitutes an escalation of the dispute. 
Such a move is likely to increase the stakes both by increasing the direct costs of 
administering the proceedings, and the associated opportunity cost from the use of legal 
and administrative resources for the particular dispute, as well as indirect costs (and 
possibly also benefits) associated with its impact on the reputation of the participants. In 
this regard, avoiding an escalation of the dispute is desirable. 
 
But there are also other aspects to take account of. To start with, the problem of defining 
the unit of account is as pervasive here is in studies of participation. Another aspect is the 
selection of conflicts that lead to requests for consultations. Presumably they are not a 
random selection, but tend to be special in some sense. What are these special   23
characteristics? How come that the conflict could be solved once it reached the 
consultation stage, but not before? Why does the interaction between the parties change, 
as the dispute is filed with the WTO? From a theoretical point of view, the answers to 
these questions are far from obvious, even though one might intuitively identify some 
explanations.
12 There are also other aspects of settlements that one may wonder about, 
such as the terms of the solution when these are not made public, for instance, to what 
extent do they abide by the Most-Favored Nation provision? 
 
Several empirical papers have examined various aspects of the time profile disputes, and 
in particular, the propensity for settlement, during the GATT and the WTO periods.  
 
IV.2.1 Does the DS mechanism ease settlement? 
A first issue of interest is whether the DS mechanism actually eases settlement? One way 
to approach the issue is to examine whether the introduction of changes to the DS system 
that can be expected to enhance the system can be shown to actually lead to more 
settlement? Busch [2000] takes such an approach when studying the impact of the 1989 
Dispute Settlement Procedures Improvement reform, which provided for the right to a 
panel. The study estimates several logit models employing data on bilateral disputes for 
the whole GATT period. Three separate binary dependent variables are included, 
indicating whether partial or full remedies are agreed during the consultation phase, 
whether the dispute was paneled, and whether there are concessions during the panel 
stage. The independent variables include a dummy for whether the year is before or after 
the 1989 Improvement, and a variable capturing the dyad’s joint democracy score. A 
number of additional explanatory variables are used, indicating for instance, the number 
of complainants joining the dispute, whether it is brought by a developing country against 
a developed country, the degree of trade dependence, and the trade openness of the 
parties. 
 
                                                 
12 For instance, Busch and Reinhardt [2001], Reinhardt [2001], and Guzman and Simmons [2002], discuss 
theoretical aspect of settlements. Busch and Reinhardt [2006] argue that third-party participation 
undermines pre-trial negotiations. They test their hypothesis using their data set and find that third party 
participation lowers the prospect for early settlement.    24
A main finding by Busch [2000] is that the 1989 Improvement, which allegedly 
sharpened the DS mechanism, did not foster more concessions under either the 
consultation or panel stage. The study also found that respondents with a larger share of 
trade in GDP tend to settle less under the consultation stage, contrary to what might 
perhaps be expected.  
 
Busch and Reinhardt [2003b] present empirical evidence suggesting that the advent of the 
DSU significantly improved the propensity of respondents to concede, when considering 
aggregate numbers, even though this depiction is not valid for developing country 
complainants, or for disputes between the EC and the US. However, the more favorable 
picture during the WTO years does not stem from an increase in early settlement due to 
the introduction of the DSU, but is instead argued to be the result of the expanded scope 
of actionable cases, and more rich country complaints against developing countries. 
During the WTO era, richer complainants (in terms of GDP per capita) have been more 
likely to induce settlement than poorer countries, controlling for differences in GDP. But 
contrary to what one might assume however, the authors argue that this is not because 
richer complainants find it easier to induce compliance, nor is that poorer countries 
disproportionately lose disputes, but instead because they are less successful at inducing 
other countries to settle.  
 
The WTO impact on the lifespan of disputes are highlighted by Grinols and Perrelli 
[2006]. They develop a theoretical model that predicts that the DSU should lead to more, 
and to shorter, disputes before the WTO. In order to empirically investigate these 
predictions, the authors examine three types of disputes, all of which involving the US, 
by means of various forms of duration analysis
13: USTR Section 301 disputes 1975-2000, 
GATT disputes 1975-1994, and WTO disputes 1995-2000. An initial finding shows that 
the increase in the number of disputes during the WTO era cannot be readily explained by 
                                                 
13 The main application of duration analysis in economics has been to labor market issues, such as the 
movement in and out of unemployment, but have recently found applicability to a number of economic 
phenomena where there is movement in and out of different groups. But these methods have not been 
employed elsewhere to the context of dispute settlement, as far as we are aware. Grinols and Perrelli [2006] 
provide brief explanations of a number of the parametric, semi-parametric, and non-parametric duration 
analysis methods they employ.    25
the expansion of membership that occurred during this period – most respondents that the 
US has litigated against during the WTO era were also members of the GATT. Nor can 
the trend be explained by increased trade volumes; something else must lied behind it, 
such as the change in the nature of dispute resolution under the DSU. 
 
Grinols and Perrelli [2006] indeed find that the advent of the WTO had a positive and 
significant impact on the number of multilateral disputes (still involving the US), but that 
it did not significantly affect the number of Section 301 cases. The reason seems to be an 
increased propensity by the USTR to use the GATT/WTO dispute resolution mechanism. 
Grinols and Perrelli [2006] also shows that the average lifespan of disputes are 
significantly shorter since the advent of the WTO, even though the more exact impact is 
rather complex and depends on the nature of the dispute. 
 
IV.2.2 When is settlement most likely? 
A second issue that has attracted interest in the literature is when during the process is 
settlement most likely? Reinhardt [2001] uses two ordered probit models, applied to data 
on GATT disputes initiated between 1948 and 1994. The dependent variable is an ordinal 
measure indicating whether the respondent conceded fully, partially or not at all, to the 
demands by the complainant.
14 One model runs this variable against a few variable 
capturing mainly when the panel was established, and the direction in which the panel 
outcome went, whereas the other model includes these variables and a large number of 
other variables capturing various characteristics of the countries involved, the measure at 
stake, and the dispute itself (most of which turn out to be insignificant). 
 
A striking feature of both these models is that the establishment of a panel makes 
concessions significantly more likely. As expected, a ruling in favor of the defendant 
makes it less likely with a concession, but even more surprisingly is that this is also true 
in case it goes against the respondent. The publishing of the panel verdict as such tends to 
make it less likely with concessions (this effect is significant in the first model only). It is 
                                                 
14 Much of this classification stems from Hudec [1993}, but it has also been revised and updated by 
Reinhardt [1996], Reinhardt [2000], and Busch [2000].   26




The study by Busch [2000], while not focusing directly on this issue, is consistent with 
the findings by Reinhardt [2001]. Busch and Reinhardt [2003b], considering concluded 
GATT/WTO disputes between 1980 and [2000], bring further evidence to bear on this 
issue. They show that the reason why these countries are less prone extract concessions is 
not that they lose dispute more frequently compared to richer members, but their inability 
to take advantage of the pre-panel publication stage for settlement. This in turn is 
explained by lack of legal capacity, rather than power for enforcement. 
 
IV.2.3 The role of political governance for the propensity to settle 
A third theme in the literature is whether there are differences between democratic and 
less democratic states in their propensity to settle? A number of arguments can be made 
in either direction. Examining this question empirically, Busch [2000] finds that during 
the GATT period, disputes between democracies were more likely to be settled during the 
consultation stage, compared to when either of the parties to the dispute were less 
democratic. The pattern did not persist however once a panel had been constituted. Busch 
[2000] also shows that countries with a large trade to GDP ratio were less likely to settle 
both before and after the constitution. 
 
Guzman and Simmons [2002] examine the role of democracy for the propensity to settle, 
but from a different angle. Their argument is based on the assumption that transfer 
payments among states are costly, and that trade measures that are of an all-or-nothing 
nature, are likely to be harder to settle on than those concerning measures of a more 
continuous nature. A natural solution to this indivisibility problem is to introduce some 
form of side payment or broaden the negotiation by introducing additional issues. 
Guzman and Simmons [2002] argues however, that democracies will find it more 
                                                 
15 Reinhardt [2001] also develops an incomplete information model that shows, among other things, why 
the threat of a ruling by an adjudicator, rather than the ruling itself, may induce compliance.   27
difficult to do this, since the opposition to the broadening that will come from the 
exposed sectors will be much harder to withstand in a democracy.  
 
In order to examine the empirical validity of their theory, the authors the extent to which 
the “lumpiness” of the issues involved in disputes can explain whether disputes lead to 
panels or not. To this end, all WTO disputes are classified into one of two groups: those 
addressing continuous measures (tariffs, non-zero quotas, or subsidies), and those 
involving discontinuous measures (bans, health and safety regulations, product 
classification issues, and absence of required laws). A number of controls are also 
introduced. A first set is intended to capture the relative power of the parties to the 
dispute, and include dummies for whether it is a developing country against a developed 
country, etc, various measures based on GDP, and the complainant’s dependence on the 
respondent’s market (hypothesizing that the larger this dependence, the more prone will 
the complainant be to accept a proposed solution). There are also controls for institutional 
factors, such as whether the complainant and respondent are both parliamentary rather 
than presidential, the idea being that parliamentary governments tend to be less exposed 
to protectionist legislative pressure. Another institutional control captures whether the 
countries involved are democracies. Since democratic governments are likely to find it 
more difficult to withstand protectionist pressure, they should be expected to be more 
prone to leave decisions for panels, rather than settle themselves. Finally, Guzman and 
Simmons [2002] also control for general trade dependence, arguing that more trade 
dependent states should be more prone to take a dispute to a panel in order to obtain a 
clear ruling. 
 
The above-mentioned variables are used in a number of logit models. Generally, 
speaking, the results support the notion that the lumpiness of the issue affects paneling 
decisions, but the relationship is more complex than was hypothesized, since it interacts 
with the nature of the political structure in a complex fashion. Both lumpiness, and the 
degree of democracy, tends to reduce the propensity to panel, thus contradicting what 
was expected to be the case. However, the combination of a lumpy issue and a 
democratic pair tends to have a positive impact on the paneling propensity. There is also   28
a certain tendency for large complainants to settle more often, but this seems unrelated to 
the relative size of the complainant and the respondent as such. 
 
 
V.  AREAS IN NEED OF FURTHER RESEARCH 
 
The discussion so far sought to portray the main themes in the theoretical and in 
particular the empirical literature. We will end by pointing to some of the 
weaknesses/lacunae we see in this literature.  
 
V.1  Weaknesses in the empirical work 
Although it is difficult to synthesize the empirical literature highlighted here, the general 
picture emerges as follows. Export values, or the diversity of exports, go a long way 
toward explaining the distribution of the number of disputes that have reached the WTO. 
But developing countries still seem to be at a disadvantage in their propensity to act as 
complainants. The Legal Capacity Hypothesis finds support, while the picture is more 
mixed with regard to the Power Hypothesis. Finally, the nature of the mode of 
government is important, with more democratic countries seeming more prone to be 
involved in disputes on either side. 
 
So what remains to be done? As already mentioned, the issues under study in this 
literature are highly complex, and it uses a very large brush when painting its (normally 
non-formalized) theory. There are therefore a number of problems in this literature that 
need to be resolved in order for the findings to become more than just suggestive. In what 
follows we will briefly point to some of the problems we see (the order is not meant to 
indicate the relative importance we attach to these issues). 
(i)  A first issue is the choice of unit of account. There is indeed an awareness in the 
literature of the importance of this matter. In particular, several studies use other 
definitions, capturing various aspects of the bilateral nature of disputes. However, we are 
not aware of any study that seriously contemplates what is “one” issue in a complaint. 
Was the Banana dispute about one issue – such as the EC banana import regime – or was   29
it about several issues, such as the distribution system, quantitative import restrictions, 
etc? Or, to take the EC - Sardines dispute: was it about the labeling of sardines, or about 
the role of international standards, or both? More generally, we are not aware of any 
attempt to derive the definition of “one” dispute from any underlying theory. At the same 
time, we add up number and seek to draw inferences on the basis of these numbers. In our 
view, this problem is sufficiently severe to lead us to seriously question the 
meaningfulness of the whole literature on “bias” in participation. At the very least, one 
would like to see much more systematic analysis of the sensitivity of the findings to the 
choice of unit of account. 
 
(ii)  Another critical issue for studies of biases in participation is obviously the 
definition of the non-biased benchmark. For instance, the notion employed by Horn et al 
[1999] that in an unbiased situation, each country would complain in proportion to how 
often it encounters illegalities, as long as the trade values involved exceed some lower 
threshold, is highly dubious in that it ignores the fact that the a market with a $1 million 
turnover may be as important to a small country, as is a market with a $100 million 
turnover to a 100 times larger country. Here, there is an urgent need for formulations that 
are much better grounded in theory. 
 
(iii)  A somewhat related problem in this context is how to deal with the indivisibility 
of disputes. For instance, if a group of countries according to some measure should have 
.4 disputes, but has none, is this to be treated symmetrically to the situation where a 
country should have 9.4 disputes, but has 9? 
 
(iv)  The proxies for legal capacity, in particular, seem very crude. There is a need to 
identify exactly what type of capacity is needed, and when. For instance, is it the capacity 
to detect illegalities, or to litigate once they are detected? How do we take account of the 
fact that even developed countries tend to hire private counsel when litigating? Perhaps 
this suggests that it is not legal capacity, but the lack of budgetary resources that is 
missing? Thus, there is also a need for clearer conceptual view of what the differences 
might be between rich and poor countries, as well as better proxies for whatever is   30
decided to be the appropriate variables to capture. There is also a need to refine the 
proxies employed to measure power, even though we see less of a problem here. In 
particular, one would want to see measures that are more sensitive to the nature of the 
bilateral relationship between countries, than those commonly employed. 
 
(v)  Closely related to the question of how to define an unbiased benchmark, is that of 
why and when countries commit illegalities? For instance, is it typically done in order to 
defuse domestic political pressure that otherwise would pose a more serious threat to the 
country’s ability to maintain its commitments, are illegalities mainly the result of obscure 
agreements, or of aggressive pursuit of national (or interest group) interests? 
Understanding such questions is crucial to the formulation of an unbiased benchmark for 
the propensity to litigate, among many other questions: for instance, if small countries 
face proportionally more illegalities than larger countries, a non-biased benchmark should 
possibly require that small countries use the DS system more than proportionally. There 
are a few papers that provide theoretical explanations for when illegalities may be 
committed, such as Bown [2002], Bütler and Hauser [2000], Grinols and Perrelli [2003], 
and Guzman [2003]. However, there is little empirical work that sheds light on this issue. 
An interesting first step has been taken by Bown [2004b], who examines the determinants 
of countries’ choices of whether to violate or adhere to GATT rules when making trade 
policy changes during rounds. But more theoretical and empirical work on these issues is 
highly desirable. 
 
(vi)  A more general issue is how to interpret the selection of requests for 
consultations? To date, a little more than 300 hundred such requests have been filed in 
the WTO, but it is inconceivable that this would represent the totality of grievances that 
WTO members have had with other members during the 10 years since the advent of the 
WTO. On the contrary, what has been registered with the WTO Secretariat is not just the 
tip, but the tip of the tip of the iceberg. This raises the extremely important questions for 
this literature of whether we can by studying these relatively few disputes, draw any 
inferences about the working of the DS system, for all those markets and trades where no 
complaint is filed? If we believe this to be the case, then how do we explain the fact that   31
these particular conflicts ended up as formal disputes at the WTO, while other conflicts 
did not? That is, what determines the selection of disputes that appear before the WTO? 
Perhaps there is something special about them, and it is for precisely this reason that they 
are brought to Geneva? There are reasons to suspect that the disputes in the WTO are not 
representative of conflicts in general. While a member can always decide unilaterally to 
litigate, in most cases such a decision will be preceded by contacts between the two sides 
to the conflict. It is only when they both decide not to give in that there will be a 
consultation request. Similarly, the DSU requests a period of consultation before 
proceeding to the panel stage. Since litigation uses substantial resources on both sides, 
one would normally expect the parties to settle before this stage, unless their subjective 
probability distributions over outcome of the litigation diverge significantly. The disputes 
we see in the DS system, at least those that reach the panel stage, are hence those where 
both sides find it worthwhile to participate in costly litigation. Indeed, it seems 
implausible that this would be the case for the bulk of trade conflicts. The registered 
disputes are thus most likely different from other conflicts. The question of how they 
differ remains unanswered. 
 
(vii)  A closely related issue is how to interpret the observation that a certain group of 
countries have (relative to some benchmark) launched few complaints? This may be due 
to the fact that the mere threat of complaints from this group has sufficed to keep its 
trading partners from invoking policies that the group would complain about? Or maybe, 
on the contrary, this group distrust the system to such a degree that it does not find it 
worthwhile to pursue disputes, or maybe it lacks the resources to identify issues that 
would be worthwhile to contest, or to litigate about issues it has identified? Our intuition 
may suggest one answer or another to these questions, but this does not suffice if we want 
to make methodologically more well-founded claims concerning the effect of the system.  
 
(viii)  Yet another problem is the fact that what is ultimately of interest is presumably 
the extent to which the whole DS system provides sufficient benefits to, for instance, 
developing countries. It is possible, at least in theory, that, countries that are not active 
complainants (or third parties) still benefit from the efforts of more active members. If a   32
member A successfully attacks an import measure maintained by member B, member C 
who happens to export the same product may also benefit from A’s victory. Hence, if we 
are to evaluate the beneficiaries of the system in general, we have to take into 
consideration these indirect effects. Differently put, it seems likely that there will often be 
positive externalities from complainants to other exporters, at least as long as rulings are 
implemented respecting the Most-Favored Nation principle. One should therefore also 
expect there to be problems of free-riding between members. And it is not inconceivable 
that there may also occasionally be negative spillovers. Regardless of the direction of 
these externalities, they need to be taken account of in an assessment of the pros and cons 
of the DSU relative to some benchmark. 
 
V.2  Why an explicit agreement in the context of an incomplete agreement? 
An obvious question concerns the role of an explicit (as opposed to an implicit) 
mechanism. We have so far tried to focus on work that examines explicit mechanisms, 
but it is not always clear why the highlighted insights would not also apply to informal 
mechanisms. Intuitively, it would clearly be impossible to coordinate on an implicitly 
agreed DS mechanism with as much detail as DSU. What is less clear however, are the 
features of the situation that would arise absent the explicit agreement. There is here very 
little formal literature to lean against. 
 
A second area that we feel is poorly understood is the role of dispute settlement in the 
context of an incomplete contract. Intuition would suggest that the problems facing a DS 
mechanism, and its role, would be very different if the agreement only contained easily 
verifiable commitments, such as tariff bindings, compared to the situation where there are 
a number of other provisions, such as that of National Treatment. We would thus like to 
see more analysis of the optimal design of dispute settlement in the context of incomplete 
contracts. 
 
V.3  Does the DS mechanism serve its purpose?  
A difficult but crucial issue is whether dispute settlement mechanisms in the GATT and 
the WTO have served their purposes? As was seen above, the literature on settlements   33
can be viewed as an attempt to answer this question, assuming that the purpose is to 
foster settlement. But as we have seen, there may be a conflict between fostering 
settlement, and maintaining system integrity. Consequently, it is possible, at least as a 
theoretical proposition, that by enhancing settlement, the DS system in the e.g. the WTO 
has reduced trade liberalization.  
 
This leads us to the basic question of what is the real purpose of WTO, and for whom? 
Economists, at least, would almost by reflex assume that the purpose is to liberalize trade, 
and the Preamble to the Agreement Establishing the WTO also mentions substantial tariff 
liberalization (and non-discrimination) as a purpose. At the same time, there is a real 
issue whether trade is much more liberal today than it would be absent a multilateral 
agreement. For instance, would trade barriers be significantly higher between say the EU 
and the US absent the WTO? If it could not be shown that the WTO have had a 
significant liberalizing effect for its main players, could the purpose of the agreement be 
better understood as being something else than trade liberalization? Indeed, in the policy 
discussion, proponents of the WTO often mention stability of rules, transparency, etc, as 
main objectives of the agreement. Others may argue that a main purpose of the GATT, at 
least, was more political than narrowly economic. 
 
The reason for mentioning this issue in this context is that the role of the DS mechanism 
might be very different if the purpose is to improve transparency, or the stability of 
economic or political relationships  rather than to foster trade liberalization. Whenever we 
evaluate the achievements of the DSU, we cannot avoid to openly or implicitly take a 
stance on the question of what the agreement is to achieve in the first place.  
 
V.4  The quality of adjudication 
The discussion so far has dealt primarily with quantitative aspects of dispute settlement in 
the GATT and the WTO, even though we have occasionally touched more qualitative 
question such as the possibility for countries to settle before paneling. As noted above, 
the resolution of disputes may indeed be the main purpose of a dispute settlement 
mechanism. However, it seems reasonable to assume that its purpose is not only to induce   34
settlement, but also to promote a desirable form of implementation of the agreement.  
This raises a new set of issues concerning both the terms at which settlement occurs, and 
in particular about the qualitative nature of determinations by the adjudicating bodies. 
 
Of course, decisions from the adjudicating bodies of the GATT/WTO have been subject 
to much analysis in legal literature. There seem to be fewer attempts to discuss these 
issues from the point of view of a joint legal and economic perspective, however. But an 
assessment of the case law would be very partial if performed from a legal perspective 
only: it can hardly be denied that a main purpose of the GATT, and perhaps even more 
the WTO, is to achieve various economic aims, as is also stipulated in the Preambles of 
the Agreements. Whether decisions by the adjudicators contribute to achieving these aims 
cannot be evaluated without an economic analysis of the case law.  
 
The literature does contain some joint economic and legal analyses. For instance, Sykes 
[2003a] discusses the WTO case law on safeguards and concludes that inherent problems 
with these provisions have been exacerbated by a lack of acknowledgement, by panels 
and the Appellate Body alike, of the problem before them. Sykes [2003b] examines the 
case law on the necessity-test, the notion that when deviating from their obligations, 
WTO members have to ensure that they choose the least restrictive (in terms of impact on 
international trade transactions) means to reach their ends. Sykes [2003b] argues that it is 
typically hard to detect any systematic criteria being employed by adjudicating bodies. 
Horn and Mavroidis [2004a] discuss the case law on tax discrimination cases. They come 
to a similar qualitative conclusion, being unable to discern what method of analysis the 
adjudicating bodies employ.
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16 The studies from the ongoing American Law Institute project Principles of International Trade Law: The 
World Trade Organization also largely support this critique of the quality of the case law. In this project, a 
group of economists and lawyers have been scrutinizing all Appellate Body reports, as well as un-appealed 
panel reports, issued since January 1, 2001, from a joint law and economics perspective. While not always 
disputing the outcome of the determinations, a very common finding is that decisions are extremely 
deferential to the words used in the WTO agreement, which are often read in clinical isolation of their 
context, that is, without WTO judges asking, and answering, the question of what function any given legal 
instrument has been assigned to play. Rulings are also very often criticized for lacking economic logic. 
These studies are published in Horn and Mavroidis [2004c], [2005] and [2006]. See www.ali.org.    35
To conclude, the few attempts of putting the adjudication in the WTO into a joint 
economic and legal perspective, tend to be rather critical of the methodological side of 
rulings. However, most of the studies of this type provide ad hoc analyses of either 
specific rulings, or less frequently, the case law under certain provisions. There is 
therefore a need for much more systematic analyses of the quality of the case law.  
 
V.5 Evidentiary  standards 
A special aspect of the quality of the case law are the evidentiary standards employed by 
the adjudicating bodies. Horn and Mavroidis [2004b] discuss one special aspect: the role 
of the burden of proof in disputes involving the interpretation of National Treatment. In 
their view, the burden has too easily been shifted over to respondents, with the 
consequence of leading to too many “convictions”. Grossman and Sykes [2006] consider 
some principle aspects of another facet of evidentiary standards – the rule of waiver. 
They examine how such rules may affect the number of claims brought before the 
adjudicators, and thus also litigation costs.
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The distribution of the burden of proof (production), as well as the associated required 
level of persuasion, are critical for determining the ambit of the provisions of many of the 
central provisions of the WTO. This will become increasingly the case since, as a result 
of the continuing reduced relevance of protection through classic trade instruments, 
disputes arise more and more frequently between one informed (the regulating party) and 
one uninformed (the challenging) party. This process will become even more pronounced 
if the Appellate Body starts practicing what it says it will: to treat regulatory intent as part 
of the standard of review in such cases. 
 
V.6  The role of the judge  
As a final area in a far from exhaustive list of lacunae in the literature, we would like to 
mention the question of the role of the judge. For instance, the European Community has 
recently submitted a proposal to replace the existing regime of ad hoc panels with one of 
                                                 
17 Yet another aspect of the evidentiary standards concerns the appropriate role of scientific 
expertise.   36
permanent panelists. This proposal has been suggested to have a dramatic effect if 
implemented. However, we are not aware of any research from a law and economics 
perspective of how the composition of the adjudicating bodies may affect systematically 
affect rulings.    37
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